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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
more than entertain a motion for inspection, and hence an invocation of the extraordinary remedy of prohibition was unwarranted. 4
b. Contempt, refusal to answer after immunity: Once a
witness before a grand jury is properly apprised of his statutory
immunity from prosecution for any crime disclosed by his testimony,35 even though such witness may suspect that he himself may
be one of the targets of the investigative proceedings," he may
not refuse to answer questions propounded by that body on the
of his constitutional protection against self-incriminaground
7
3

tion.

Defendant, in Peoplev. Breslin,88 was a witness before a grand
jury inquiring into the commission of the crimes of bribery, conspiracy and gambling who refused to answer questions by that
body after he had been advised of his statutory immunity from
prosecution for any crimes his answers might reveal. The Court
of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the conviction of defendant in the court below of criminal contempt of court, noting
that the defendant was not entitled to remain silent even though
he feared the implication of himself in criminal matters once adequate immunity had ' been granted. 89
Bail
As a general matter, sureties are held to rigid accountability
on their bailbond in the event of their principal's disappearance ;40
and this, clearly, is for the purpose of promoting the administration of the criminal law.41

Although the bondsman's horizon

is not, therefore, devoid of the clouds of risk, under certain circumstances the remission of a forfeited bailbond may be warranted.4
34. See Hogan v. Court of General Sessions of New York County, 296 N. Y. 1,
68 N. E. 2d 849 (1946).
35. See PENAL LAV §§ 381, 584, 996 (applicable immunity statutes).
36. Such compulsory disclosure is warranted only when the protective purview of
the immunity completely obviates the possibility of prosecution for crimes principally or
incidentally disclosed. See Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 142 (1913) ; Matter of
Doyle, 257 N. Y. -244, 250-251, 177 N. E. 489, 491 (1931).
shall be compelled in
37. N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6 provides that no person ...
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
38. 306 N. Y. 294, 118 N. E. 2d 108 (1954).
39. See. r. g., Matter of Doyle, note 36 supra; Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116
N. E. 782 (1917) ; People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 209 (1st Dep't 1938),
aff'd, 280 N. Y. 539, 20 N. E. 2d 8 (1939) ; People v. Cahill, 126 App. Div. 391, 110 N. Y.
Supp. 728 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd, 193 N. Y. 232, 86 N. E. 39 (1903).
40. See People v. Parkin,263 N. Y. 428, 432, 189 N. E. 480. 482 (1934).
41. People v. Schwarze, 168 App. Div. 124, 126, 153 N. Y. Supp. 111, 112 (2d Dep't
1915) ; People v. Licenziata, 230 App. Div. 358, 360, 244 N. Y. Supp. 731, 733 (2d Dep't
1930), afftd. 256 N. Y. 534, 177 N. E. 129 (1931).
42. CODE CImr. Paoc. §§ 597, 598; see People v. Spear, 1 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 538
(1883).
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People v. Fialnnacaet al.,"1 involved a proceeding on motion for
the remission of forfeiture on the grounds that sureties were suffering from ill health and had limited incomes. Indicating that
their respective means of support were meager, sureties went on
to state generally that they received income benefits from real
property and capital resources. Absent a revelation by sureties
of the extent of their real property holdings and capital resources,
the Court of Appeals affirmed a reversal by the Appellate Division"' of the lower court's order remitting the forfeiture and estreatment of bail, on the ground that hardshiphad not been sufficiently shown.
. In October of 1948, Fiannaca and another were charged with
burglary and grand larceny. Fiannaca was admitted to bail, and
on numerous occasions in 1948 and 1949 the case was moved for
trial, but for some reason not specifically indicated, was not finally
noticed for trial until October of 1952. Defendant failed to appear, and bail was forfeited. As it appeared on affidavits of appellants to remit forfeiture, Fiannaca was mentally examined in
Rochester County Hospital and committed in July, 1951. 41 He
escaped in October, one year before his case was noticed for trial,
and has not been heard of since.
t appears well established that where the defendant has
been returned within a reasonable time after forfeiture has occurred, a remission is warranted if the People have not been
ubstantially prejudiced in any way by his nonappearance, especially where such does not appear to have been deliberate. 8
Similarly, within certain circumstantial limitations, death, insanity, or imprisonment on another charge will warrant remission.47 Otherwise, the only case for remission, where the principal disappears, depends on the severity of the hardship surety
will suffer by forfeiture. 8
Additional to its holding that sureties did not adequately
demonstrate hardship, the court also commented:
43. 306 N. Y. 513, 119 N. E. 2d 363 (1954).
44. 282 App. Div. 548, 125 N. Y. S. 2d 396 (4th Dep't 1953).

45. Fiannaca was committed under

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW

§ 74.

46. People v. Continental Gas Co., 301 N. Y. 79, 83, 84, 92 N. E. 2d 898, 900,

901 (1950) ; see also Note 84 A. L. R. 420 (1933).
47. E. g., see Note 40 supra; see also Note 7 A. L. R. 392 (1920) ; Note 26 A. L. R.
412 (1923). But cf. Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366 (U. S. 1873); People v. Green,
36 App. Div. 60, 62, 56 N. Y. Supp. 277, 278 (1st Dep't 1898).
48. B. g., People v. Spear, I N. Y. Cr. Rep. 538 (1883); Matter of Pellegrino,
207 N. Y. 770, 101 N. E. 1113 (1913) affirming 152 App. Div. 482, 137 N. Y. Supp. 305
(2d Dep't 1912).
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a. that the delay in moving the case for trial did not present
mitigating circumstances such that remission should be granted ;4"
and
b. that the circumstances of defendant's confinement under
the Mental Hygoiene Law,5 0 which indicates it does not apply to
those awaiting criminal trial, and his subsequent escape, do not
make out a case for remission, particularly in view of available
provision for commitment to a mental institute in the Code of
Criminal Procedure insuring adequate safeguards against escape.Y' The court further remarked that sureties had more than
adequate time to learn of Fiannaca's mental condition and have
him properly committed by the court, or surrender the principal
and rid themselves of the obligation to prodace him upon trial.2
In a dissenting opinion by Judge Froessel, it was denominated
a "travesty on justice. 3 that the State should collect a "debt" it
created itself by its agents' careless guarding of the defendant who
got away.
It is perhaps noteworthy that neither opinion comments
specifically on the reasons why four years elapsed before the case
was moved for trial, other than to suggest, by way of conjecture,
that the incarceration of Fiannaca's codefendant was the cause. It
may be deemed unfortunate that a surety is subject to such an
elastic expansion of risk where trial is delayed for an inordinate
period of time without requiring the People to produce adequate
circumstances palliative of th6 postponement. Under the express
dictum of the case, in this regard, the surety's only protective
means available is the surrender of his principal whenever the
risk of forfeiture impresses him'as being imminent.
At the Trial
a. Privileged communications: The right to counsel, inherent in the concept of a fair trial, 5 4 embraces the right to consult counsel in private, -either in the confines of an office or at the
49. CODE CRIer. PROC. § 590 provides for surrender of defendant in exoneration of
bondsman.
50. See note 45 supra: see also People on co,nhlaint of Scheinberg v. McDermott,
179 Misc. 89, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (Magistrate Ct. 1942).
51. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 658-662-f provides for an inquiry into sanity of defendant,
before or during trial, or after conviction; an inquiry into ". . . such state of idiocy,
imbecility or insanity that he is incapable of understanding the charge . . . or of making
his defense .

.

.. "

There was no showing that Fiannaca was of such mental abnormality

at the time of his civil commitment.
52. See note 43 supra at 518, 519, 119 N. E. 2d 363, 366.
S3. Id. at 520. 119 N. E. 2d 363, 367.
54. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; People v. McLaughlin, 291 N. Y. 480, 482, 53
N. E. 2d 356, 357 (1943) ; Williams v. Kaiser,323 U. S. 471, 473 (1945).
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